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Abstract 
Nowadays, the European electricity systems are evolving towards a generation mix that is more 
decentralised, less predictable and less flexible to operate. In this context, additional flexibility is 
expected to be provided by the demand side. Thus, how to engage consumers to participate in demand 
response is becoming a pressing issue. In this paper, we provide an analytical framework to assess 
consumers’ potential and willingness to participate in active demand response from a contract 
perspective. On that basis, we present policy recommendations to empower and protect consumers in 
their shift to active demand response participants. 
Keywords 
Electricity system; demand response; contract; energy policy 
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1. Introduction* 
Traditionally, electricity systems are operated on the basis that the supply is adjusted to follow the 
load in real time, meaning that the flexibility to maintain balance between electric power supply and 
demand is mostly provided by the generation side, which is dominated by centralised, large-scale, 
flexibly dispatchable (fossil fuel and hydro based) power plants. Nowadays, the European electricity 
systems are evolving towards a generation mix that is more decentralised, less predictable and less 
flexible to operate due to the massive integration of renewable and distributed energy sources in order 
to meet the 20-20-20 targets (EC, 2009a, 2010c). To enable the large-scale integration of these 
renewables in order to advance the decarbonising of electricity systems without endangering the 
security of supply, additional flexibility is expected to be provided by the demand side through 
demand response programmes.  
Indeed, demand response is a tool to reduce or postpone other costly investments in network 
reinforcement and in new flexible fossil fuel based or nuclear generation by shifting demand to times 
when there is more renewable power available, making (local) balancing easier and reducing overall 
system costs (De Jonghe et al., 2012; Dietrich et al., 2012; Moura and de Almeida, 2010; Redpoint 
Energy and Element Energy, 2012; Stadler, 2008). Its value and necessity as a flexibility means has 
been widely recognised by policy makers in Europe (EC, 2007a, 2010a, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b; 
ENTSO-E, 2012b; ETP SmartGrids, 2012).  
In view of this value, there is a massive body of knowledge emerging on smart grids and demand 
response, both in the academic literature and within the industry. 
First, much research is driven by the availability of smart technologies (Smart-A, 2008; 2009b; 
Sustainability First, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Indeed, a recent survey of pilot studies on demand 
response demonstrates that smart appliances and enabling infrastructure significantly improve the 
responsiveness of consumers to dynamic price signals (Faruqui et al., 2013). However, two main 
challenges remain for the deployment of this ‘hardware’: what is ‘smart’ technology and how does it 
get deployed? On the one hand, there is still a lack of standardisation with regard to what this 
technology should be capable of, as the minimum functionalities of smart meters and smart appliances 
and the interoperability standards are still under discussion (EC, 2009b, 2010d, 2011c, 2012c). On the 
other hand, there is a chicken-and-egg problem with regard to deployment of this smart technology: 
without the infrastructure, smart appliances and demand response cannot be used to their expected 
potential by the consumers and without demand response through smart appliances, the limited 
benefits of the enabling infrastructure do not justify the costs of its roll-out (EA Technology, 2011; 
ETP SmartGrids, 2011; Smart-A, 2009a). The deployment of this hardware is then a process with 
different speeds across Europe (EC, 2012d). 
Second, even if the technology challenges are adequately dealt with, there is an issue of split 
incentives for the different actors along the value chain (Consumer Focus, 2013a). As a result, there is 
lively debate within the industry on the role of different incumbent and emergent
1
 actors in the 
organisation of smart grids and demand response (e.g. CEER, 2011a; Ruester et al., 2013b; Smart 
Grids Task Force, 2013).  
                                                     
*
 This article is based on the report of FP7 THINK project on ‘Shift, Not Drift: Towards Active Demand Response and 
Beyond’, written by the same authors. 
 The authors gratefully acknowledge the input and feedback received from Patricia de Suzzoni, Manuel Sánchez Jiménez 
and Judith Ward throughout the research for this paper. 
1
 The incumbent actors encompass TSOs, DSOs and suppliers; emergent actors include e.g. aggregators, manufacturers of 
appliances and devices, retailers in sectors other than electricity or ICT companies. 
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Besides the technical hurdles and the challenges with regard to the roles of different market players, 
there is still a third challenge to be resolved to get demand response to take-off: how to activate the 
consumers. Recent research on consumer price elasticity shows that the demand side, especially the 
residential and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) consumers, is not very active nowadays, 
even when retail price variation through time of use tariffs is present (e.g. Allcott, 2011; Lijesen, 2007; 
Torriti, 2012). Pilot studies on smart grids do find indications that consumers respond to prices (e.g. 
CER, 2011; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Faruqui et al., 2013; Ivanov et al., 2012; Stromback et al., 
2011), but the results of these studies cannot be generalised because of the experiment design or the 
often limited sample sizes. Yet, consumers making the transition towards activeness are key to the 
future role of the demand side as a source of flexibility for the electricity system (Bradley et al., 2013). 
It has been pointed out, e.g. by Olmos et al. (2011), Stromback et al. (2011), Cappers et al. (2012) or 
Gyamfia and Krumdieck (2012), that the potential of smart meters and smart appliances is 
significantly limited if the consumer is not engaged to use them. Eurelectric (2011) also expects 
consumers to be able to manage and adjust their electricity consumption in response to real-time 
information and changing price signals. The aforementioned literature clearly recognises the 
importance of active consumers for demand response; there is, however, limited understanding on how 
to effectively activate consumers to participate in demand response. (Lewis et al., 2012; Delmas et al., 
2013) consider that engaging consumers to make the transition from passive to active can be 
considered a major challenge for successful demand response take-off. Dulleck and Kaufmann (2004) 
demonstrated that providing customers with more information can affect electricity demand in the 
long run but not in the short run. Vassileva et al. (2012) point out that to help consumers make better 
decisions by providing feedback on their energy consumption, a good understanding of consumers is 
needed in terms of their personal preferences with regard to how to receive this feedback, e.g. 
consumers without internet want a non-electronic means of communication. This need for 
understanding consumers is further demonstrated in the empirical work on consumers’ selection of 
tariff programmes by Dütschke and Paetz (2013), who find that consumers prefer simplicity over 
dynamic programmes and that automation is a (necessary but insufficient) prerequisite for consumer 
participation in demand response. A comprehensive understanding of consumers’ motives to become 
active demand response participants is thus required. Measures to engage and empower consumers 
should be based on such understanding.  
Therefore, this paper investigates how to engage and empower consumers, in particular small 
consumers connected to the distribution grid (residential and SME consumers) – including consumers 
who have self-generation (so-called ‘prosumers’), to shift towards active demand response participants. 
The focus is given to small consumers because industrial consumers, given their size and skills, and 
facing less market barriers and transaction costs than small consumers, already have the possibility to 
be active today if they want to; even if industrial demand response is often still limited (Hopper et al., 
2006; Sustainability First, 2012c), on the one hand. On the other hand, in the decentralising electricity 
system, flexibility is needed at a much more local level than in the past; the many small consumers 
connected to the distribution together make up a large potential for flexibility (ETP SmartGrids, 2011).  
The paper adopts a consumer-centred approach, which means that we do not relate consumers’ 
responsiveness only to the potential of financial incentives, as is often the case in pilot studies – but 
explore a wider set of costs and benefits that consumers would be exposed to from the perspective of 
contracts and demand response intermediaries. Our analysis reveals the importance of contracts in 
promoting consumers’ participation in active demand response. It is shown that the diversity of 
contract types as well as of intermediaries is vital if the active demand response is to take off to the 
benefit of consumers.  
This paper is then organised as follows: in Section 2, we focus on the demand response contracts 
through which consumers are likely to participate in demand response, how these contracts interact 
with different types of consumers, and how consumers can be empowered to manage the contract 
selection process. Next, in Section 3, we examine the role of the intermediaries that consumers sign 
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this contract with, how this intermediary affects consumers’ engagement to participate in demand 
response, and how negative effects for consumers can be limited or avoided. The paper ends with a 
discussion of the presented recommendations and conclusions on how to engage and empower 
consumers to make the transition to active participation in demand response. 
2. Interaction between contracts and consumers 
Residential and SME consumers will participate in demand response through dedicated ‘demand 
response contracts’ that are, in principle, distinct from ‘electricity supply contracts’. An electricity 
supply contract arranges the provision of electric power to a consumer by an electricity supplier. A 
demand response contract, on the other hand, governs the relationship between the consumer, who 
adapts his consumption in response to a signal, and the demand response intermediary, who is the 
counterparty that provides this signal.
2
 This distinction is necessary, first, to focus on demand response, 
regardless of whether it is offered separately from or included in a supply contract. Second, in many 
countries, emerging market players are effectively proposing stand-alone demand response contracts 
to consumers, providing an alternative to the demand response contracts offered by incumbent 
suppliers. Hence, our analytical distinction does not necessarily imply that consumers participating in 
demand response have to manage two separate contracts; they could be merged into one contract. 
In this section, we first present a categorisation of contracts according to their technical features 
and the high levels terms they impose on consumers. Then, by investigating consumer load mix and 
consumer preferences, we demonstrate the necessity of having diversified demand response contracts 
to engage different consumers. Furthermore, we identify the challenges of contract selection and put 
forward recommendations to empower consumers, enabling them to manage their contract selection 
process. 
2.1 Diversity of contract types 
Based on the existing literature (e.g. Albadi and El Saadany, 2008; Borenstein, 2005; Braithwait and 
Krisch, 2006; Brattle, 2011; DOE, 2006), experience from industrial consumers’ demand response and 
practice in recent as well as on-going pilot projects, we distinguish five types of contracts that could be 
offered in the electricity market: (1) time of use (TOU) pricing, (2) dynamic pricing, (3) fixed load 
capping, (4) dynamic load capping, and (5) direct load control. Every conceivable set of contract 
terms
3
 should then belong to either one contract type or a hybrid of these types
4
.  
We first systematically classify the different contract types with regard to their technical features, 
being form of signal and volatility of signal; the latter encompasses both notice time and granularity. 
Next, we discuss for each contract type the high-level terms imposed on customers. These terms are 
not limited to the financial compensation that can be expected for such a contract, but also include 
price and volume risk, complexity and loss of autonomy/privacy by the customer of such contract.
5
 
The technical features and the high-level terms are summarised in Table 1. 
                                                     
2
 By convention in this paper, when ‘contract’ is mentioned, we refer to a demand response contract. Whenever we refer to 
an electricity supply contract, this will be done explicitly as ‘supply contract’. 
3
 Contract terms include the establishment of time intervals, prices, quantities, termination fees, start and end dates, access 
to consumer data, et cetera. 
4
 Hybrids of multiple contract types are conceivable, e.g. direct load control added to TOU pricing or TOU/ dynamic 
pricing added to fixed load capping. Critical peak pricing (CPP) is a special case of dynamic pricing with very high prices 
during critical events when demand exceeds supply; CPP is thus a price signal that is superimposed on the normal price 
signal and could thus also be considered a hybrid.  
5
 It is worth noting that this selection of criteria is not aiming at an exhaustive evaluation; instead, we intended to focus on 
criteria that could discern the impact of different contracts on consumers. 
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2.1.1 Technical features: signal form and volatility 
The form of the demand response signal is either price or volume: 
 Price-based contracts: use a tariff for electricity as the signal form to trigger a change in the 
consumption; 
 Volume-based contracts: constrain the load, i.e. the instant electric power consumption, to a 
contractually defined floor and/or cap; 
For either of those contracts, the signal volatility can be low (static) or high (dynamic): 
 Static contracts: the signal is established with long notice for a number of predefined, relatively 
extended intervals; volatility of the signal is low; 
 Dynamic contracts: the signal is established with short notice and for shorter intervals that better 
reflect wholesale market trading intervals; volatility of the signal is high. 
We further distinguish a control-based contract in which the consumer cedes control over specific 
appliances to the counterparty in the contract. The consumers are therefore not expected to react to any 
signals themselves. 
Time of use pricing is then a static price-based contract, with dynamic pricing the dynamic as its 
counterpart. Fixed load capping and dynamic load capping are the respective static and dynamic 
volume-based contract types. Finally, the direct load control contract is the control-based contract 
type. 
2.1.2 High-level terms imposed on consumers 
The contract types implicitly or explicitly impose high-level terms on the customers of these contracts. 
These terms are financial – price risk and financial compensation, and non-financial – volume risk, 
complexity, loss of autonomy and loss of privacy. 
 Price risk reflects the uncertainty of the price for the consumer. It is only present in price-based 
contracts and it is higher for the dynamic contract type (dynamic pricing) than for the static variant 
(time of use pricing). Due to this price risk, in some contracts, the consumer might end up with a 
higher bill than expected if he does not respond to the price signals. 
 Volume risk reflects the uncertainty of the power that will be available to the consumer and is only 
present in volume-based contracts. In other words, with certain contracts the consumer might have 
access to less power (equivalent to being curtailed) than is needed for all wanted end-use services, 
or he might have to consume more than expected (or at least pay for this unconsumed energy) if 
his current consumption does not meet his floor restriction. Volume risk is higher for dynamic 
load capping contracts than for fixed load capping contracts. 
 Complexity refers to the difficulties consumers could have with understanding what is expected 
from them, e.g. having to deal with signal volatility, or learning the impact of different appliances 
on power consumption. Complexity is higher in dynamic contracts than in their static counterparts; 
it is also higher for volume-based contracts as consumers have come to grips with the load impact 
of different appliances. Direct load control is a fairly simple contract for consumers because all 
control decisions are outsourced. 
 Some contracts affect the degree of freedom in consuming power by limiting the total load or 
controlling the individual appliances– in other words, consumers experience a loss of autonomy; 
the consumer is then also expected to reveal some personal information with regard to, e.g. what 
appliances he has and when he prefers to use them, resulting in a loss of privacy. Autonomy (being 
in control) and privacy (non-disclosure of personal information) are distinct issues that are, 
however, closely related. Loss of autonomy/privacy is absent in price-based contracts, limited for 
volume-based contracts (as power can be curtailed, consumers cannot always have all end-use 
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services they want) and high for the direct load control contract that signs away all control for part 
of the load to a third party. 
 Financial compensation: the contracts include financial compensation, directly or indirectly, that 
should correspond to the imposed terms in the contract. Dynamic contracts typically have a higher 
compensation potential than static contracts. For direct load control, the compensation is related to 
the size of the load that is part of the contract. 
An overview of all these features can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1. Diverse contract types: technical features and high-level terms imposed on customers 
Contract type Technical features High-level terms 
Signal 
form 
Signal 
volatility 
Price risk Volume 
risk 
Complexity Autonomy/ 
Privacy loss 
Financial 
compensation 
Time of Use 
pricing 
Price-
based 
Static Low None Low None Limited 
Dynamic 
pricing 
Price-
based 
Dynamic High None High None High potential 
Fixed load 
capping 
Volume-
based 
Static None Low High Limited Limited 
Dynamic load 
capping  
Volume-
based 
Dynamic None High High Limited High potential 
Direct load 
control 
Control-
based 
Predefined None None None High Limited/ High 
potential 
 
2.2 Consumer classification 1: Consumer load mix 
The first justification for the existence of diversified contracts lies in the fact that the ability of 
consumers to participate in demand response can be associated with their ‘load mix’; and there are as 
many load mixes as there are consumers. The classification of consumers according to their load mix 
would then help to distinguish consumers in terms of the flexibility of their load and, consequently, 
how responsive they can be to the different signals provided by the different types of contracts. 
In this section, we first define consumer load mix. Second, we demonstrate how the 
appropriateness of a contract for a consumer depends on the match between his load mix and the 
technical features of the contracts.  
2.2.1 Consumer load mix 
There are many studies trying to classify load in an attempt to derive its potential to participate in 
demand response. Wood and Newborough (2011) classifies load into ‘unpredictable’, ‘moderately 
predictable’ and ‘predictable’ loads. But the correlation between ‘predictability’ and ‘flexibility’ of 
load is not straightforward; being predictable doesn’t necessarily mean that such load could be more 
easily shed or postponed. And such predictability of energy consumption is much related to consumer 
behaviours, which are not supposed to be fully rigid. Another way to categorise consumers’ load is by 
the appliances of the household, such as in Smart-A (2008). It offers very detailed information about 
consumers’ technical capacity to be responsive, but does not allow taking into account the behavioural 
aspect, and moreover, it is hard to generalize for SME consumers. We recognize that there are 
different degrees of flexibility that one can expect from consumer load, analogue to a generation mix. 
Therefore, we classify consumer load into five load types that together make up the consumer load 
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mix: (1) storable load, (2) shiftable load, (3) curtailable load, (4) base load, and (5) self-generation 
(Figure 1). This way, how appliances are used to provide end-use services is also reflected in the load 
characterisation, allowing consumer behaviour to be taken into account in the estimation of the 
consumer’s potential to participate in demand response.  
Figure 1. Load mix made up of different proportions of storable load, shiftable load, curtailable 
load, base load and corrected for self-generation (examples serve an illustrative purpose) 
 
Consumer load, i.e. the power consumption from the electricity grid, can first be segmented in 
storable load and non-storable load. 
1. Storable load: the power consumption and the end-use service are decoupled by storage that can 
be in the form of (electrochemical) batteries or thermal inertia. 
Next, non-storable load can be further segmented in shiftable load and non-shiftable load. 
2. Shiftable load: power consumption can be moved in time without affecting the end-use service. 
Shiftable load often involves a non-interruptible process like a laundry cycle and thus involves 
some planning.  
Non-shiftable load then is further segmented in curtailable load and non-curtailable load. 
3. Curtailable load: power consumption cannot be shifted without affecting the end-use service, but 
the service can be interrupted instantly. 
The remaining non-curtailable load can be classified as base load. 
4. Base load: the end-use service needs instant power and cannot be interrupted or shifted in time. 
The load refers to net electric power consumption from the grid and is thus equal to the total power 
consumption corrected for self-generated power by the prosumer. 
5. Self-generation: power generation on the premises of a consumer, reducing the net load. 
Dispatchable self-generation can be used as back-up power. 
Together, the different proportions of these load types make up the consumer load mix; this load mix 
could then be qualified by its dominant load type: e.g. a ‘curtailable load mix’ then has a dominant 
share of curtailable load. Consequently, consumers with a dominant share of base load can be seen as 
the least flexible, while consumers with a dominant share of storable load can be considered the most 
flexible. 
Finally, it is important to note that the load mix of consumers is not static but can change over time. 
Indeed, taking into account that the load mix depends not only on the appliances but also on the 
lifestyle of the occupants of the house, there are several circumstances that can lead to a significant 
Self-
generation
Load mix
Storable loadNon-storable load
Shiftable loadNon-shiftable load
Curtailable loadNon-curtailable load
Base load
E.g. electric vehicle, 
heating, cooling, 
battery, etc.
E.g. laundry, dish
washer, tumble 
dryer, vacuum 
cleaner, stove, etc.
E.g. l ighting, TV,
handyman tools,
computer, etc.
E.g. burglary alarm,
automation, TV, 
l ighting, etc.
E.g. solar-PV,
solar-boiler, 
micro-chp,
small
biomass,
small wind 
power, etc.
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change of the consumer’s load mix; the acquisition of new appliances with new functionalities (as an 
electric vehicle) and the job switching by one of the occupants are examples of such circumstances. 
2.2.2 Matching the contract to load mix  
As the load mix defines the potential of a consumer to participate in demand response, the right 
contract is needed to valorise that potential. In this section, we associate the load mixes to the static or 
dynamic nature of the demand response signal in the different contracts. 
 A curtailable load mix can interrupt load instantly and is thus particularly able to respond to 
dynamic signals. Dynamic pricing and dynamic load capping can be appropriate contracts for this 
consumer category. 
 A shiftable load mix needs some planning of load and thus benefits from static signals that are 
notified well in advance and are less volatile within the day. TOU pricing and fixed load capping 
fit well for this class of consumers. 
 Storable load allows using load so flexibly that it can respond to both static and dynamic contracts. 
Furthermore, the decoupling of power consumption and end-use services makes this load suitable 
for a contract with third-party control. A direct load control contract, as well as all other contracts 
might then be appropriate. 
 Finally, some consumers might have a base load mix, which has limited flexibility and is not 
suitable for participation in demand response. This consumer class might not find a contract that is 
appropriate for their load mix. 
So, a consumer’s potential to participate in demand response will be maximised if the technical 
features of the contract match the flexibility of the load mix. If a consumer cannot find a contract that 
allows his demand response potential to be valorised, he might choose not to participate at all.  
2.3 Consumer classification 2: Variety of consumer preferences 
Besides the technical ability, the engagement of a consumer to participate in demand response depends 
on his individual ‘preferences’ regarding the costs and benefits that he associates with his participation.  
 Costs refer to what the consumer perceives as something asked from him by the counterparty. 
 Benefits refer to what the consumer perceives as compensation in return for his participation. 
Such costs and benefits are associated with consumer related criteria such as altruism and prosocial 
motivation (Delmas et al., 2013), price risk, volume risk, complexity, loss of autonomy/privacy, and 
financial compensation. These criteria have been used to differentiate the contract types (Table 1), 
except for altruism and prosocial motivation, which are intrinsic to consumers and thus independent 
from all contracts. 
Consumers make an individual evaluation of these criteria. For instance, loss of autonomy can be a 
cost for one consumer whilst a benefit for another; and different consumers might attribute different 
value to the same criterion. So, depending on the individual consumer’s preferences, different 
contracts might then be appropriate to increase or maximise the willingness of a consumer to 
participate in demand response; illustrated here for two possible consumers.  
 A well-educated consumer who is risk seeking in order to increase his financial compensation, but 
is also concerned about his privacy. 
o Benefits: high potential for financial compensation, high price risk, no loss of privacy; 
o Costs: complexity and autonomy. 
Dynamic pricing might be the most appropriate contract for consumer classes with similar 
preferences. 
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 A less-educated consumer who is not used to complexity and is more willing to outsource the 
handling of complex technology, even at a small cost. 
o Benefits: low complexity, high loss of autonomy, low price risk; 
o Costs: volume uncertainty, limited financial compensation. 
Direct load control, TOU pricing and fixed load capping might be appropriate contracts for the 
class of consumers with similar preferences. 
If a consumer cannot find a contract reflecting his preferences, he might refrain from participating in 
demand response. The contracts must therefore be diversified enough to increase participation rates, 
providing a second justification for needing a set of diversified contracts. 
Similarly to what has been discussed for the consumer load mix, also the preferences should not be 
considered static over time. The way consumers valorise the different contract terms may change over 
time. 
2.4 Challenges and recommendations for contract selection 
We have now demonstrated that existence of diverse contract types is needed to reflect different load 
mixes and consumer preferences. We have also demonstrated and illustrated in the previous sections 
that the five contract types discussed in this paper make up such a diversity that is able to match 
different consumers. However, consumers might still find it difficult to select, first, the right contract 
type for them from a set of diversified contracts, and next, find the best contract terms for that contract 
type. First, we identify the challenges in contract selection; second, we discuss how to empower 
consumers to manage the selection process. 
2.4.1 Challenges in contract selection 
The contract selection process for consumers can be broken down into four steps, including: (1) 
qualifying their load mix, (2) recognising their preferences, (3) selecting an appropriate contract type, 
and (4) finding the best contract terms. Each of these steps can be a challenge for a consumer. 
1. Qualifying the load mix: consumers might not be aware of how their use of appliances affects 
their ability to participate in demand response (e.g. just considering all load as base load); they 
might also not be aware of the possibilities of their load to be used more flexibly; or they might 
lack the skills to tap into the flexibility potential (e.g. they do not know how to programme their 
washing machine). 
2. Recognising consumer preferences: consumers might not be aware of costs and benefits that are 
implicitly present in the contracts; they might not reveal their preferences; they might also lack the 
skills to properly evaluate costs and benefits. 
3. Selecting an appropriate contract type: a consumer’s load mix might not be aligned with his 
preferences regarding the costs and benefits related to his participation in demand response (e.g. a 
consumer with a curtailable load mix – dynamic contracts, who prefers low uncertainty and low 
complexity – static contracts). In the light of consumer rights in Europe, it should be clear that the 
consumer makes the final decision in this regard and he cannot be forced to enter a specific 
contract type (EC, 2007b, 2010b). 
4. Selecting the best contract terms: contract types are generic forms of contracts; the consumer will 
still need to find an actual implementation of it; lack of comparability in contract design might 
then prevent a consumer from identifying the best contract terms; the variation in contract terms 
might become too large to be able to choose. 
How to engage consumers in demand response: a contract perspective 
9 
2.4.2 Empowering consumers for contract selection 
Here we present recommendations on a toolkit to empower consumers, enabling them to overcome the 
challenges in contract selection.  
Furthermore, the presented tools do not only remedy specific issues, but they contribute to the 
gradual building of consumers’ trust in demand response. 
2.4.2.1 Consumer profiling 
Consumer profiling, is an instrument that helps a consumer in making explicit (1) his load mix, (2) his 
preferences and (3) how the contract types can be associated to load mix and preferences; thus dealing 
with the first three aforementioned challenges in contract selection. Moreover, the unique features of 
consumers in terms of load mix and preferences are sufficient to evaluate the potential responsiveness 
of different consumers. Thus, the categorisation of consumers according to these features may be 
considered as an accurate classification of consumers. Moreover, the market players offering the 
demand response contracts have an interest in consumer profiling too for their customer segmentation. 
In practice, load profiling comes down to surveying the consumer on his load mix using the 
typology of load types introduced in Section 2.2.1, and on his preferences by including criteria like the 
high-level terms that are explicitly or implicitly imposed on consumers through the contract types, as 
summarised in Table 1.  
Consumer profiling then helps consumers (1) by facilitating contract selection through the 
recognition of the consumer’s load mix and preferences, (2) by educating consumers on their load mix 
and preferences, and (3) by correcting/adjusting past choices based on regular profiling. 
Since demand response is a market activity, the intermediaries who propose the contracts would 
also have an interest in providing a proper consumer profiling, as it provides them accurate 
information to build their customer segmentation. However, to avoid excessive intrusion and facilitate 
market supervision, high level guidelines on the profiling methodology needs to be provided by 
national authorities. It is stressed that consumer profiling needs to be conducted in full transparency 
with the consumer and can only be started with the consent of the consumer. 
2.4.2.2 Contract comparison tools 
Consumer profiling helps a consumer to select an appropriate contract type, but there could exist many 
different sets of contract terms for this contract type. A contract comparison tool, then, directly 
addresses the aforementioned fourth challenge in contract selection by raising consumer awareness 
and facilitating comparison. 
To fulfil its function, a contract comparison tool, like a price comparison tool, has to satisfy a 
number of requirements (CEER, 2012a; Consumer Focus, 2013b; Ofgem, 2013). The main 
requirements are as follows. First, the provider must be certified and highly trustworthy, thus an 
independent actor is best placed to provide this service. Second, the methodology for comparing 
contracts should be transparent and clearly defined by the regulator. Third, contracts should include 
those contract terms that are most relevant for contract comparison; the establishment of a minimum 
set of contract terms to be defined in each contract could be useful in this regard. Fourth, consumers 
must be able to compare the performance of their contract ex post to the expected performance of their 
current contract terms and other contract terms offered on the market. 
2.4.2.3 Optimising the range of contracts 
One standard contract will not allow all consumers to participate in demand response, whereas having 
too many contracts might make it impossible to compare and choose the best contract, even with tools 
to assist in contract selection. Thus, an adequately large range of contracts involves a trade-off 
Xian He, Nico Keyaerts, Isabel Azevedo, Leonardo Meeus, Leigh Hancher, Jean-Michel Glachant 
10 
between having the market offer unlimited tailored contracts adapted to individual needs (one extreme) 
and having only one standard contract for all consumers (another extreme). The national regulatory 
authorities could play a role in optimising the range of contracts for consumers’ interest (Ofgem, 
2012). Some harmonisation of contract design is necessary to allow the regulators to efficiently 
monitor the range of existing contracts before trying to reduce or increase the range. 
Therefore, the national regulatory authority could impose a notification requirement for every 
contract that is going to be offered on the market. This notification should include the signal type and 
volatility (see Table 1) allowing the regulator to connect the new contract to one of the contract types. 
Such harmonisation can also help directly reducing transaction costs for consumers, e.g. by reducing 
complexity and facilitating comparison, thus lowering searching costs. 
2.4.2.4 Protection of personal information 
To participate in demand response, the consumer is required to reveal personal information: first, to 
facilitate the contract selection process (revealing load mix and preferences), and second, to comply 
with the contract terms with regard to the sharing of data and personal information. Furthermore, we 
have illustrated that volume-based and control-based contracts imply a loss of privacy to different 
degrees: limited for the load capping contracts and high for direct load control contracts. 
The consumer must be confident that personal information and data will only be used for clearly 
consented purposes. Adequate data protection rules should therefore be implemented to overcome 
challenges one to four (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2013; EC, 1995). The starting 
principle must be that the consumer is in control: a party requesting access to information should be 
explicit about what information is needed and with what frequency, and the requested data must only 
become available after explicit consent to the request by the consumer (CEER, 2011b). 
2.4.2.5 Protection of vulnerable consumers 
In the light of the on-going work in the Citizen’s Energy Forum’s Vulnerable Consumer Working 
Group and of the development of an energy policy for consumers, we can observe here that additional 
assistance and protection for vulnerable consumers is justified; in fact, a basis already exists in the 
framework of the internal market for electricity (EC, 2009c, 2010a). Other measures could also be 
considered at the Member State level, such as protecting vulnerable customers through social welfare 
systems. 
2.4.2.6 Promotion and dissemination of pilot projects 
The contract selection represents a new challenge for consumers as well as for policy makers, 
intermediaries, etc. Therefore, the development of the contracts as well as of the supporting contract 
selection tools will be a learning process for all stakeholders. The pilot projects on demand response, 
which currently aim at testing the acceptability of the new technology and related commercial 
arrangements with consumers, could be of great added value to this process. 
Nowadays, there is already a significant number of pilot studies on demand response, some still on-
going (ADDRESS, 2010; Frontier Economics and Sustainability First, 2012; Stromback et al., 2011). 
Despite the number of existing studies, the lessons learned concerning the consumer and the contracts 
from the existing set of studies are limited and insufficient to feed the debate on how to engage and 
empower consumer to participate in demand response. There remains a need to promote more 
contract-oriented pilot projects in the future in order to reach a consensus on the understanding of 
consumers' engagement. Additionally, consumers should also be made aware of the output of these 
studies to show them the potential benefits for society and for themselves. 
It is also noted that, due to the local character of demand response, pilot projects are mostly 
conducted in a decentralised way; and so is the dissemination of their output. The resulting lack of 
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coordination between different projects, as well as the limited dissemination of results prevents 
different stakeholders from sharing their experiences and improving the understanding of consumers' 
engagement. Currently, reporting in pilot studies is mostly focused on technological developments, 
while it should also be oriented around providing output to feed into the consumer-focused policy 
making (Lewis et al., 2012). Indeed, information relevant for the development of decision-making 
tools, such as consumer profiling and contract comparison tools, could be tested in pilot projects and 
the results could be compared across the projects. Therefore, in order to extract the most value from 
these projects, there is a need to establish reporting guidelines so that the output can be easily 
disseminated and benchmarked. 
3. Variety of intermediaries and their impact on consumers 
Even if in principle consumers can offer their demand response services without the intervention of an 
intermediary, residential consumers and SMEs face certain barriers to directly participate in the energy 
markets such as market rules defining too high thresholds, and the transaction costs and risks that are 
too high if managed at individual level. The first set of barriers could be removed by changing the 
market rules, while the second set of barriers still remains. That is why there is a need for 
intermediaries to facilitate the residential and SME consumers to deliver demand response. 
Intermediaries (also referred as ‘aggregators’ in the literature) are then entities that facilitate the 
demand response transaction between consumers, who provide flexibility, and demand response 
procurers, who use flexibility to optimise their businesses, through contracts as the ones discussed in 
the previous section (Figure 2). Very different entities can play the role of intermediary for demand 
response, and different entities may have a different impact on consumers. Due to such differences, we 
argue in this section for the need for a variety of intermediaries (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Moreover, we 
also discuss the factors that could hinder the emergence of a variety of intermediaries for demand 
response (Section 3.4) and provide recommendations on how to overcome these barriers (Section 3.5). 
Figure 2. Interaction between consumers, intermediaries and procurers of demand response 
services 
 
3.1 Variety of intermediaries 
Before discussing how different intermediaries may impact consumers, it is necessary to categorise the 
potential intermediaries for demand response. For analytical purposes, the large variety of entities that 
may play this role in the future is reduced to three representative intermediaries: 
 Supplier, which refers to the entities that, besides being an intermediary for demand response 
services, also provide supply services to the consumer. This then includes any company or legal 
person that sells electricity to final customers, including integrated suppliers-DSOs. 
 Third-party, corresponding to a for-profit entity having the provision of demand response 
services as its core business within the electricity sector without being a procurer of demand 
response services. ESCOs, for instance, are a potential third-party intermediary. 
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 Consumer cooperative, which refers to a non-profit entity composed by an aggregation of 
consumers. These entities are typically small and localised, e.g. organised at the neighbourhood 
level or by consumer associations. 
3.2 First reason: Intermediary preferences for the demand response contracts 
An intermediary’s preferences towards certain demand response contracts would be primarily related 
to the services that these contracts would enable, hereafter called demand response services. Since 
different demand response services may have different requirements in terms of consumer 
responsiveness, the interest of a certain intermediary in certain demand response services can make 
him inclined towards certain contracts.  
In this section, we first present the typology of demand response services. Second, we discuss the 
interest of each intermediary in different demand response services by looking at his incentive-based 
business model. Then, we discuss the matching between the technical features of each demand 
response service and the features of each demand response contract. The outcome of this analysis will 
then reveal the possible preferences of certain intermediaries over certain contracts. 
3.2.1 Typology of demand response services 
Demand response as a means of flexibility can have an impact both in the short term, for efficient and 
reliable operation of the total electricity system, and in the long term, for adequacy optimisation of this 
electricity system. Indeed, it can offer a diverse set of services to the electricity system. Within this 
section, we present a typology of demand response services, including a discussion on their specific 
technical requirements and on their procurers. 
We consider that demand response can offer five different types of services
6
 to the electricity 
system:  
1. Portfolio optimisation, which is used by market players to meet their load obligations at minimum 
costs by arbitrating between generation and demand response on different time horizons. This 
service is procured by suppliers and other wholesale actors. 
2. Structural congestion management, which aims at solving congestion in the transmission system 
‘that can be unambiguously defined; is predictable; is geographically stable over time; and is 
frequently reoccurring under common circumstances’ (ENTSO-E, 2012a). This service is 
procured by TSOs and DSOs. 
3. Occasional physical congestion management, which aims at solving physical congestion which is 
unpredictable and occasional, e.g. caused by distributed generation and renewable energy sources. 
This service is procured by TSOs and DSOs. 
4. Balancing of electricity system, which refers to the ‘procurement of balancing reserves (capacity) 
and balancing energy by the TSO to perform balancing, meaning all actions and processes, on all 
timescales, through which TSOs ensure, in a continuous way, to maintain the system frequency 
within a predefined stability range’ (ENTSO-E, 2013). In other words, the TSO balances demand 
and supply by procuring fast sources of flexibility. This service is procured by TSOs and in the 
future potentially also by DSOs. 
5. Ancillary services, which refer to ‘a range of functions which TSOs contract so that they can 
guarantee system security. These include black start capability, frequency response, fast reserve, 
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 The demand response services discussed in this paper are a selection of possible services that have been discussed in the 
literature (e.g. DOE, 2006; Ofgem, 2010a; Frontier Economics, 2012). This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of 
flexibility services that could be offered now or in the future through active demand response. 
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the provision of reactive power and various other services’ (ENTSO-E, 2012c). This service is 
procured by TSOs. 
As these services help resolve different problems in the electricity system, they have different 
requirements in terms of reaction time (how fast flexibility can respond to the activation signal ranging 
from minutes, e.g. to balance wind unpredictability, to hours for predictable events like structural 
congestion management services), duration (the timespan of the perturbation to be covered can last 
seconds, e.g. for ancillary services, minutes or even hours, e.g. for structural congestion management 
services) and firmness (the level of guaranteed delivery of the service). Non-compliance to firm 
commitments in a contract is subject to contractual penalties. These penalties could be severe as 
firmness of services like ancillary services, balancing services or occasional congestion management 
services is critical for the electricity system.
7
 The technical requirements of the different demand 
response services are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2. Technical requirements of different demand response services in terms of reaction time, 
duration, and firmness 
Service type Reaction time Duration Firmness 
Structural congestion management Slow Long Low 
Portfolio optimisation Slow Long or short Low 
Occasional congestion management Fast Short High 
Balancing services Fast Short High 
Ancillary services Very fast Short Very high 
 
3.2.2 Interaction between demand response services and demand response contracts 
We have discussed in the previous section that in order to provide different services, demand response 
needs to fulfil different technical requirements. We have also discussed in Section 2.1 that different 
demand response contracts have different technical features. Then, it is expected that there is a relation 
between the contract types and the demand response services. Indeed, the requirements of the demand 
response services need to be adequately reflected in the contract features to ensure technical 
requirements are met by the consumer’s demand response. Table 3 offers an overview of the plausible 
matching. 
  
                                                     
7
 A more detailed analysis of reaction time, duration and firmness in the context of demand response can be found in 
Grünewald and Torriti (2012, 2013) 
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Table 3. Matching between demand response services and demand response contracts based on 
technical features of contracts and technical requirements of demand response services* 
Contract type Structural 
congestion 
management 
Portfolio 
optimisation 
Occasional 
congestion 
management 
Balancing services Ancillary services 
Time of Use (TOU) 
pricing 
     
Fixed load capping      
Dynamic pricing      
Dynamic load 
capping  
     
Direct load control      
*Blank spots in the table indicate that requirements of demand response service are not sufficiently reflected in demand response 
contract features 
Some general insights of matching the demand response services to the contracts can be drawn from 
the table above (Table 3):  
 Demand response services that require firmness match with volume-based contracts and in 
particular with direct load control contracts if, additionally, the response should be fast and 
available at very short notice.  
 Demand response services which require less firmness could be met by price-based contracts.  
 The optimisation of structural electricity system issues can be handled by static contracts that 
match with the need for a persistent signal over a longer interval, whereas services that need to be 
fast and variable are better embodied by dynamic contracts. 
3.2.3 Business model: intermediary preference towards demand response services 
One might expect that any intermediary would always offer all demand response services in order to 
maximise the overall value of demand response. This expectation, however, may not be materialised 
because in reality, intermediaries can have divergent business objectives which make them attribute 
less or more value to certain services. Moreover, these services can differ in terms of risk, which might 
be perceived differently by different intermediaries. Hence, the business model of the intermediaries, 
i.e. making profit out of selected demand response services, can differ. This sub-section then discusses 
how the interest in demand response services can differ for different intermediaries by first analysing 
the intermediary’s core business and second their risk preferences.8 
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 Note that this paper does not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of intermediary incentives, but instead focuses on 
two incentive issues that show a potentially biased relationship between the demand response intermediary and certain 
demand response services. More information on intermediary incentives can be found in reports discussing the value of 
demand response (e.g. DOE, 2006; Frontier Economics, 2012; Ofgem, 2010a). 
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Core business 
Out of the three considered entities, one has another core business in the electricity system -- the 
supplier (selling energy) -- while the other two (third-party and consumer cooperatives) could 
establish their business only with demand response. If the core business of the actor is not demand 
response intermediation, the incentives for being an intermediary could somehow be affected by the 
incentive in their core business. Here we discuss two cases:  
1. In the case that certain demand response services can be for self-use, the intermediary might have 
a higher incentive to procure those services. 
- Supplier: might focus on self-optimisation of its portfolio of generation and demand;  
2. In case certain demand response services are in conflict with the intermediary’s core business, he 
might have a preference for not procuring it.  
- Supplier: core business is to sell energy, whereas demand response may be used to reduce the 
consumer’s load. Demand response can thus be competing with supplying more energy. 
The two effects discussed above could explain the possible preferences of the supplier towards a 
limited number of demand response services. 
Business risk preferences 
The risk preference is another factor to explain why an intermediary could incline to certain contracts. 
Intermediaries that are more risk averse might turn away from those demand response services whose 
business risk is perceived as too large.  
These business risk preferences can be attributed to limited skills with concern to trading in 
different energy markets. Or the limited size of the demand response business can turn away the 
intermediary from markets with large exposure due to volatility. For instance, the balancing market is 
often smaller in size, less liquid and more volatile than the day-ahead spot market. In some electricity 
systems, procurement of ancillary services and congestion management tools might be non-market 
based and thus less transparent, increasing business risk for market players. 
Risk averseness might potentially be higher for those intermediaries that have no vested business in 
the electricity system. Indeed, these actors are more likely to lack a robust core business that provides 
a financial cushion. Out of the considered actors in this paper, the commercial third party and the 
consumer cooperative fit this profile, but suppliers could also be less or more risk averse.  
The intermediary’s risk preferences can thus further narrow down his preferences towards demand 
response contracts. 
Concluding, different intermediaries may have incentives to target specific demand response 
services and, consequently, to prefer specific types of demand response contracts. As seen in Section 2, 
the existence of diverse contract types is necessary in order to better fit different consumers’ load 
mixes and preferences. The intermediaries’ preferences towards demand response contracts could then 
affect consumers by reducing the diversity of contracts available. 
Nonetheless, intermediaries’ differing preferences towards demand response contracts are not 
necessarily an issue for consumers. In fact, even if not all the contracts are offered by a single 
intermediary, they could still be available if different intermediaries coexist. Thus, a range of diverse 
contracts matching different consumers’ preferences would still be available, but it would be offered 
by different intermediaries. 
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3.3 Second reason: Intermediary impact on consumers’ surplus 
Another reason for why a variety of intermediaries is necessary lies in the fact that different 
intermediaries may affect consumers’ benefits differently, i.e. the financial compensation that 
consumers receive from their participation in demand response. This financial compensation is related 
to the value of the flexibility services that the intermediaries procure from consumers via the contracts. 
Consumers’ surplus discussed in this section refers to the value of the financial compensation that 
consumers receive by participating in demand response.  
The impact of intermediaries on consumers’ surplus can be twofold: first, the overall profit 
captured from demand response may differ depending on the entity that plays the role of intermediary; 
and second, different entities may split the profit with the consumer differently. In what follows, we 
present an analysis of the twofold impact, then summarised by Table 4. 
The overall profit 
The overall surplus (the size of the cake) that can be captured by different types of intermediaries can 
be associated with (1) the openness of the intermediary towards the different services and (2) the costs 
of trade for this intermediary in providing different demand response services. 
The openness towards the provision of different demand response services can be hindered by the 
misaligned incentives with the core business of each entity and by his risk-averseness. Within the 
previous section, we have already assessed this issue by looking at the preferences towards the 
provision of certain services. Indeed, if the intermediary does not have the incentives to provide all 
demand response services, the maximisation of the benefit extracted from demand response might be 
impeded. However, it is also shown in the last section that it is not clear which intermediary would be 
able to capture the most value from demand response, since none of the entities would be fully open 
towards all the services that can be provided through demand response. 
The costs of trade refer to the costs different entities need to bear to play the role of intermediary, 
and this is strongly linked to both the skills of each entity and the economies of scale that can be 
achieved by the different entities. A supplier should have the necessary skills and, consequently, have 
a low cost of trade compared to a third-party and a consumer cooperative. It seems more difficult for 
the third-party to achieve high economies of scale due to higher costs to acquire customers, which is a 
typical problem for the new market players. However, commercial third-parties may have other 
businesses that, even if not energy related, already have a customer base which may reduce the costs 
related to customer acquisition. The consumer cooperative might be the model with the highest costs 
of trade, not only because the consumer cooperatives are usually extremely local (e.g. neighbourhood 
level), but also because they are commonly formed by customers who do not have specific training or 
experience in the sector. It is worth noticing that the economies of scale achieved by each of these 
entities could be very different; indeed, there are suppliers with a relatively low number of customers 
and there could be third-party intermediaries with a relatively high number of customers.
9
 
Profit sharing with consumers 
Different entities share the captured surplus with consumers (the slice of the cake) differently; how 
they share can be associated with (3) their business orientation and (4) the competitive pressure they 
are facing. 
The business orientation refers to whether an entity is profit-based and, consequently, willing to 
maximise its own profit or not. This has implications for the incentives of different entities to share the 
profit from demand response with consumers. Being profit-based, suppliers and third-parties have the 
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 For example, we could consider the case where a large telecommunications provider would offer demand response 
services to its customers (see Section 3.4.1 for a more detailed analysis of this case). 
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main goal of maximising their own profit. This may imply that as intermediaries they would, on the 
one hand, try to increase the overall profit from demand response, but, on the other hand, also reduce 
the customers’ share of the profit. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this effect may be reduced by 
the presence of high competition pressure, as discussed by the following criterion. The consumer 
cooperative is a non-profit entity, and so the whole profit is to be shared between the consumers.  
Finally, the sharing of profits with the consumers is also related to the competitive pressure each 
entity is faced with. Indeed, when an entity is profit-based, the higher the competition, the fairer the 
distribution of profits with the consumers might be. When the competition level is high, an entity 
would be willing to reduce its own profit share in order to attract more customers, while in the absence 
of competition, a customer’s choice would be reduced and so there would be no need for the 
intermediary to provide more attractive incentives. Even if this issue could also apply to a consumer 
cooperative, it is mainly relevant when assessing how supplier and third-party would share the profit 
with consumers. Currently, it is recognised that in some countries, although in theory the retail market 
is liberalised, in practice there may still be only one supplier and a consequent lack of choice for 
consumers (EC, 2010a). 
Table 4. Possible impact of intermediaries on consumers due to their entity 
Intermediary Openness to different 
services 
Costs of trade Business orientation Competition pressure 
Supplier Low: conflict with core 
business 
Low Profit-based Limited 
Third-party High Medium Profit-based Variable 
Consumer cooperative Medium: averse to 
high risk services  
High Non-profit Variable 
The above analysis shows that different intermediaries can indeed have a different impact on 
consumers’ benefit, while there is not a clear best. There seems to be a trade-off between the 
preference for specific demand response services and the costs of trade, so that the intermediary that 
maximises the overall profit from demand response may vary, e.g. depending on the most profitable 
services. Moreover, we have also discussed the fact that the coexistence of different intermediaries 
will increase the competition level, leading to a fairer distribution of profits and, consequently, higher 
consumers’ benefit. It seems therefore necessary to ensure an adequate range of intermediaries and 
proper competition in order to safeguard consumers’ benefit from demand response participation. 
3.4 What may hinder emergence of a variety of intermediaries 
In the previous two sections, we have already discussed the importance of ensuring a range of 
intermediaries. However, the existence of such a range of intermediaries may be inhibited by (1) 
market power issues and (2) the existing market rules and regulations for the provision of different 
demand response services. Within this section, we then explain how these conditions may limit the 
emergence of a variety of intermediaries. 
3.4.1 Market power issues 
The potential abuse of market power by a dominant intermediary may inhibit other intermediaries 
from participating in the demand response market, which may have negative implications for the 
consumers (as referred to in Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Indeed, this dominance in the demand response 
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market by a single entity may not only lead to an absence of an adequately large range of contracts and 
services provided, but it may also imply reduced incentives for the intermediary to fairly share the 
demand response benefits with the consumer. 
In this section, we present three distinct situations where the dominance
10
 in the demand response 
market by a single intermediary is likely to happen, namely: (1) high concentration in the supply 
market; (2) existence of integrated supplier-DSO; and (3) existence of an integrated business model 
for demand response and the deployment of smart appliances and/or enabling infrastructure.  
Dominant supplier 
Market power in the supply market may be transferred to the demand response market, due to the 
established large customer base and customers’ familiarity with the supplier. Indeed, while this 
horizontal integration of businesses would lower customer acquisition costs for the supplier to enter 
the demand response market, it would simultaneously increase those costs for the new demand 
response intermediaries that would neither have an established customer base, nor the confidence from 
the consumers. Moreover, since a supplier would provide bundling of services, it would be difficult for 
the consumer to distinguish between the costs associated with the supply of electricity and the benefits 
resulting from the participation in demand response. The potential ambiguity regarding the actual 
benefits resulting from demand response participation, would make it difficult for consumers to 
evaluate the demand response offers of other intermediaries against the bundled one provided by the 
dominant supplier. 
Hence, due to the already established contractual arrangements, a dominant supplier for domestic 
consumers and SMEs has a high probability of becoming the dominant intermediary in the market for 
demand response. 
Integrated supplier-DSO 
In certain regions, a DSO may integrate other businesses besides the operation of the distribution 
network. Indeed, there are situations where the DSO is also a supplier, a producer, a trader, or a 
vertically integrated supplier/producer/trader. If we consider the latter, the supplier-DSO (being 
vertically integrated) would have more information about the regulated demand response services as 
well as about the load profile of consumers than any other intermediary. Moreover, similarly to a 
dominant supplier, he would also benefit from the established large customer base and customers’ 
familiarity and the provision of a bundle of services (misleading the assessment of other intermediaries’ 
offers). 
Thus, due to the already established contractual arrangements and the advantage of data access, 
there is a high probability that an integrated supplier-DSO would become a dominant intermediary in 
the market for demand response. 
Dominance related to the deployment of smart appliances and/or enabling infrastructure 
The deployment of smart appliances (or enabling infrastructure) may be financially supported by a 
demand response intermediary who is interested in enabling demand response to increase his 
intermediation business. However, as a prerequisite for the support provision, the intermediary would 
probably require the ownership and/or the right to control the appliances acquired (or the developed 
infrastructure). In either case, this deployment activity would provide an advantage to this 
intermediary in relation to the others, leading to the existence of a dominant intermediary. Indeed, 
within this situation, the appliances/infrastructure deploying intermediary could have privileged access 
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to consumers’ information, and in some cases he could even impede the data access for other 
intermediaries. Moreover, this may also lead to a lock-in effect, since the intermediary investing in the 
appliances/infrastructure may impede (or make difficult) the switching of intermediaries by consumers. 
Indeed, when investing in appliances/infrastructure, the intermediary would either claim the ownership 
of the acquired goods or at least require a long-term contract in order to ensure the payback of his 
investment. 
Accordingly, an intermediary that would support the deployment of smart appliances and/or 
enabling infrastructure would likely have a dominant position in the demand response market, mostly 
due to the uneven access to data compared to other intermediaries and the lock-in effect. 
Concluding, we can say that this dominance in the demand response market by a single entity may 
emerge mainly due to four main factors: 
 The familiarity of existing entities with whom consumers already have a contractual arrangement 
provide an advantage to entities who have other business in the power sector; 
 The bundling of services and the respective billing may make it difficult for consumers to 
compare the offers made by different intermediaries; 
 The preferential or discriminatory access to data, either due to the bundling of services or to 
the ownership/control of the enabling infrastructure, hampers all intermediaries to be on equal 
footing; 
 The lock-in of consumers to a certain intermediary may also be seen as a potential barrier to the 
emergence of a wide range of intermediaries. 
3.4.2 Market rules and regulation for the provision of demand response services 
Market rules 
The markets where flexibility services are currently offered, namely the spot market and the balancing 
market, have strict rules and commitment requirements that need to be fulfilled by the actors willing to 
participate. Some of these requirements may impede some of the demand response business models 
presented in this section to take place. For instance, in France, residential demand response is not 
allowed to participate in the spot market, even when several consumers are aggregated. Here, the main 
barriers seem to be related to the firmness and marginal impact of demand response in the spot market, 
which are currently under the investigation of the French regulator (CRE, 2007; 2010). Similarly, the 
balancing market may also not be effectively open to the residential demand response in some 
countries, due to the very strict requirements such as minimum bidding volume, minimum bid duration 
and binding up and down bids (Ruester et al., 2012b). 
Even though some of the existing market rules make the participation of demand response 
intermediaries difficult, one should recall that these rules were designed to ensure the proper 
functioning of the different markets at a time when demand response was not yet considered a means 
of flexibility. Thus, it would be advisable to revisit the existing rules in a context where demand 
response is present, while assessing which rules are strictly necessary to ensure the proper functioning 
of the markets. 
Regulation 
The procurement of congestion management services and ancillary services is often not fully market 
based, but managed through bilateral contracts, tenders with generators and even mandatory 
provisions. Moreover, existing regulation does not always incentivise the procurers of these services 
(TSO and DSO) to consider demand response on equal footing with other flexibility sources. For 
instance, regulatory incentives for grid operators at the transmission and distribution levels often focus 
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on capital expenses (expansion of the grid). As congestion management through demand response 
implies an increase of operational expenses instead of capital expenses, a DSO or TSO might prefer 
grid investments that can be added to the regulatory asset base. Such an element of traditional rate of 
return regulation would hinder the deployment of innovative solutions that are less capital intensive 
(Prüggler and Bremberger, 2011). If the regulatory framework in place does not provide a level 
playing field between demand response and other sources of flexibility, intermediaries’ business 
models that target regulated flexibility services might be seen as infeasible as the procurers of these 
particular services, i.e. DSO and TSO, might not show interest in demand response. Hence, also for 
the services whose procurement is not market based, there is a need to adapt regulation in order to 
allow for demand response to compete with other flexibility sources, so that a variety of intermediaries 
may emerge. 
Furthermore, the definition of network tariffs may also need to be revisited. Network tariffs should 
provide correct signals to the market players regarding network constraints so that the demand 
response could be optimised to deliver the highest value for the overall electricity system. In the past, 
network congestion often has been positively correlated with high electricity prices as they both have 
been occurring during the peak load periods. On such occasions demand response could serve both 
purposes at the same time: reducing the local congestion and electricity generation costs. Nowadays, 
with more renewables in the generation mix, the electricity price could be low when power generation 
from renewable sources is abundantly available. In that case, demand response incentives are 
consistent with shifting load to periods of low price, causing, instead of mitigating, constraints in the 
local network. To resolve this challenging situation, it is important that the network tariff also send 
signals about the network constraints so that the network users, including the demand response 
intermediaries, can assess all incentives related to the grid and the commodity. This way, the 
individual decisions of market players could work towards the overall interest of the power system. 
The network design is beyond the scope of this paper, though it has been discussed in detail in CEER 
(2011a), Ruester et al. (2012a, 2013b) and Eurelectric (2013). 
3.5 Recommendations to achieve a variety of intermediaries 
In the previous section we have identified which conditions may hinder the emergence of a variety of 
intermediaries, including the presence of a dominant intermediary (who uses his market power to 
impede new entry), and the market rules and regulation that limit the role of intermediaries in 
providing different flexibility services through demand response. Thus, it is necessary to avoid the 
development of dominant intermediaries, on the one hand and on the other, the regulatory framework 
must also be corrected to ensure non-discrimination of demand response over other flexibility sources. 
First, in order to allow for different intermediaries to emerge, there is a need to leverage the 
advantages of the incumbents and facilitate the market entry for new market players.  
To do so, the following actions could be considered: 
1. The development of a licensing scheme specific for demand response intermediaries helps to 
increase the confidence of consumers in new entrants in the electricity sector. Such license then 
ensures that the entity fulfils the necessary conditions to provide this service. In some EU 
countries, there is already a similar scheme for suppliers so that any actor willing to provide 
supply services must fulfil certain predefined conditions, which are recognised by the attribution 
of a license. Furthermore, licenses can help regulators to impose conditions like a maximum 
period to complete a customer switching process or a minimum set of contract terms to be defined 
in the proposed contracts. The experiences with such supplier licences should be further analysed 
with regard to the benefits for consumers, the compliance of suppliers with the license terms, the 
administration costs, etc. 
2. The obligation to provide disaggregated billing information frequently enough for 
intermediaries who provide a bundle of services may facilitate the comparison of offers from 
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different intermediaries. Indeed, this would facilitate the use of comparison tools, as described in 
Section 2.4.2, helping consumers to find the best contract for them and, consequently, the best 
intermediary. We have seen in the previous section that the bundling of services, and respective 
billing, may make the assessment of different offers very difficult, due to the aggregation of the 
different services’ costs into a single bill. The EU directive for end-use efficiency and energy 
services (EC, 2006) already requires informative billing to be provided to consumers. Nonetheless, 
the mandate is mostly aiming at the recognition of actual energy costs by the consumers. Thus, it 
may be necessary to require that the financial compensation of consumers’ flexibility is also made 
explicit in the bills. Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, the consumer should have the right 
to get information on his consumption and costs (commodity and network related costs) with a 
frequency – that can be higher than the billing frequency – and through a communication channel 
of his choice.  
3. Moreover, there is a need to ensure non-discriminatory access to data for the different 
intermediaries. For instance, regulation should prohibit the information transfer from the regulated 
activity to the deregulated activity, so that an integrated supplier-DSO would not have an 
information advantage compared to other intermediaries. Any data sharing then requires prior 
consent by the consumer with the exception of metering data required for the regulated activities. 
4. Finally, in order to counteract the potential switching difficulties caused by the integration of 
demand response with smart appliances (or enabling infrastructure) deployment, one could 
consider extending and promoting the existing independent dispute resolution mechanisms 
(CEER, 2012b; ERGEG, 2010). In general, switching costs from one intermediary to another 
should be as low as possible to increase competition between intermediaries. Nevertheless, 
termination fees representing upfront investments made by the intermediaries could exist in which 
case they should be reasonable and clearly established in the contract terms. 
Regarding the existing market rules and regulation on the provision of flexibility services, change may 
be necessary to avoid discriminatory treatment of demand over other flexibility resources. Nonetheless, 
it is important to stress that the call for a non-discriminatory treatment for demand response does not 
imply an artificial bias towards procurement of demand response as compared to other flexibility 
means. A level playing field does not guarantee that all demand response services will be offered, but 
it should guarantee that the value of demand response can be monetised if it is a competitive solution. 
In what refers to market rules, there is a need to revisit them in a context with demand response to 
understand whether all the commitment requirements are still valid in such contexts. For instance, 
there are already some on-going regulatory efforts to open the balancing market to demand response. 
In France, there is a demonstration project to test the possibility of allowing a third-party intermediary 
aggregating residential demand response to participate in the balancing market. The European FP7 
project Ecogrid EU presents another innovative way to allow participation of demand response in real-
time markets: it tests a bid-less real-time market where residential consumers will be able to respond 
to prices reflecting the real-time electricity system imbalance either directly, or through an 
intermediary, without any restriction to size (Ecogrid EU, 2011). 
Moreover, regarding the procurement which is not market based (including congestion 
management and ancillary services), output-based regulation may be considered so that all flexibility 
means can be equally considered. For instance, in the UK, Ofgem’s RIIO 11 -regulation rewards 
companies that innovate and run their networks efficiently by offering incentives focused on 
delivering ‘results’ without focusing on particular means to achieve those results (Ofgem, 2010b). 
Indeed, since 2010, networks have been regulated on a TOTEX basis, i.e. their revenue is based on a 
combination of capital and operation expenses. In Italy, the regulator AEEG has started to adopt 
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 RIIO stands for Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs. 
Xian He, Nico Keyaerts, Isabel Azevedo, Leonardo Meeus, Leigh Hancher, Jean-Michel Glachant 
22 
output-based regulation for certain services of DSOs
12
 (Lo Schiavo et al, 2013). The Orkney Islands 
represents an interesting case in which innovative regulation allowed the DSO to consider all 
flexibility means (the ‘innovation’) on equal terms, including curtailment of wind power, in order to 
deal with congestion (main target), avoiding building an expensive submarine cable to the Scottish 
mainland (the ‘conservative’ approach), while allowing further connection of distributed wind power 
(other benefits) to the local distribution grid (Meeus and Saguan, 2011; SSEPD, 2012). Such 
regulation allows a level playing field to be established for demand response. It is noteworthy that 
such output-based regulation also implies significant operational challenges for the regulated actors. 
TSOs/DSOs not only need to verify the technical viability of new flexibility sources, but also need to 
ensure the coordination and communication with flexibility services providers so that these services 
are provided timely and with the anticipated quality. It could then be anticipated that the business 
model as well as the competences of the regulated actors would evolve with such regulation 
innovation (Ruester et al., 2013b).  
4. Summary of policy implications 
This paper investigates how to proactively prepare consumers to engage in active demand response as 
soon as the hardware is in place. To this aim, we adopt a consumer-centred approach, assessing a wide 
set of costs and benefits that consumers would be exposed to from the perspective of contracts and the 
counterparty – the demand response intermediaries.  
This paper proposes a consumer profiling method that is both useful for the consumers, as well as 
for the intermediaries, to have an accurate estimation of their potential to participate in active demand 
response. The profiling consists of two parts: the consumer’s technical abilities, on the one hand, and 
his preferences on high level terms of the contracts, on the other hand. The technical abilities of 
consumers are related to their load mixes, which represent their appliances and how these appliances 
are used, with, e.g. TV being perfectly curtailable at one time (re-run of a TV series) but base load at 
another time (football world cup final) for the same consumer. The willingness of consumers depends 
on their preferences regarding criteria such as price risk, volume risk, complexity, and loss of 
autonomy or privacy which are implicitly or explicitly part of the high level terms of a contract. For 
consumers to be engaged, both their load mix and their preferences must be met by the contract terms.  
Our analysis shows that the diversity of contract types is necessary for demand response to be 
appealing to a variety of consumers. There is a balance to strike between simplicity and tailored 
contracts. Such a balance can vary depending on the profile of the consumer, which is revealed by the 
profiling method we propose. Indeed, consumers might still experience difficulties in finding the most 
appropriate contract among a range of contracts. There is a need to establish tools and mechanisms, 
such as a price comparison tool, some harmonisation of contract design or data protection measures to 
further empower consumers in making their deliberate choices.  
It is also demonstrated in the paper that a single intermediary might not have the incentive to 
provide diverse contract types to consumers but would select the ones that are in line with its core 
business. However, the presence of these intermediary preferences does not mean that regulation 
should intervene and correct the business incentive of the intermediary. We demonstrate that diverse 
contract types can be provided through market forces if diversified demand response intermediaries 
enter the market. Therefore, the regulatory effort should focus on how to ensure adequate competition 
in demand response. We propose a series of measures that aim, on the one hand, at leveraging the 
advantages of the (incumbent) players, and on the other hand, at establishing a level playing field for 
the provision of flexibility services. The first set of measures includes development of a licensing 
scheme for intermediaries, disaggregated billing, non-discriminatory access to data, and formation of 
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 This output regulation applies to the investments for the purpose of service quality and distributed generation connection, 
while incentives to reduce energy losses and to improve security of supply/congestion management are still input-based.  
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independent dispute resolution mechanisms. The second set of measures is related to market rules and 
regulation: the wholesale energy markets should be gradually opened to demand side bids so that the 
value of demand response could be monetised if it is a competitive solution; regarding the 
procurement of flexibility services which are not yet market-based (including congestion management 
and ancillary services), output-based regulation could allow all flexibility means, including active 
demand response, to be equally considered.  
Finally, the measures we recommend in this paper can benefit from pilot studies and experimental 
research, which are excellent opportunities to test and improve, e.g. different contract designs, 
consumer profiling, contract comparison or disaggregated billing. Pilot studies must thus not only 
focus on technology – as is often the case nowadays, but also include the contracts that are very 
important to engage consumers. Our analysis shows that without considering the contract, pushing 
technology is ineffective because it cannot ensure that consumers become active (Ruester et al., 
2013a). Results of these studies should also be reported and disseminated in a more structured way 
than is currently the case, allowing lessons to be learnt through meta-studies of several small- and 
large-scale projects and fostering the EU wide promotion of benefits for society and individual 
consumers. We highlight that empowering consumers is also about educating consumers, e.g. in using 
data from their smart meters or in using the empowerment toolkit in order to have engaged and 
empowered consumers as soon as the hardware is in place. 
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